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Do Institutions Really Matter for Saving among 
Low-Income Households? 
A Comparative Approach  
 
This study aims to examine the extent to which competing theories explain saving of low-income households in Individual 
Development Accounts (IDAs). Competing theories include individual-oriented perspective, social stratification 
perspective, and institutional saving theory. This study uses American Dream Demonstration (ADD) data collected at 
the Tulsa IDA program. Compared with the individual perspective and the social stratification perspective, institutional 
features explain a significant part of the variance in saving outcomes measured by average monthly net deposit (AMND) 
and deposit frequency ratio (DFR). Findings suggest that an inclusive asset-based policy should be designed with 
institutional structures encouraging low-income households to save.    
 
Key words: saving; comparative perspective; Individual Development Accounts; low-income households  
 
Introduction 
 
Among the most persistent social inequality issues in America is the concentration of wealth. During 
the period between 1962 and 1995, while there was an increase in mean net worth from $143,000 to 
$215,000, median net worth increased from $35,200 to $45,600 (Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt, 1999). 
The disparity between mean and median values of household wealth attests to the considerable 
inequality in the wealth distribution (Spilerman, 2000). The richest one percent of households owns 
about one-third of the total wealth (measured as net worth) in the economy, and those in the top five 
percent hold more than half. At the other extreme, a significant fraction of households have zero or 
negative net worth (Caner and Wolff, 2004).  
 
Wealth ownership and accumulation matter for everyone. Wealth can buffer economic crises, break the 
cycle of intergenerational poverty, and build capabilities of individuals and communities to live better 
in the long term. However, the less affluent have few structured supports and incentives for asset 
accumulation. Existing asset-based policies are regressive in that they mostly benefit middle or higher 
income households. Low-income households have been largely excluded from opportunities to 
accumulate assets (Sherraden, 1991).   
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Inclusion should be a primary goal of asset-based policy. By inclusion, we mean that asset-based policy 
should broaden access to the disadvantaged and provide mechanisms to support asset accumulation. 
Given institutional opportunities to save, low-income households may be able to save despite 
economic insufficiency. The classic example of an inclusive asset-based policy is Individual 
Development Accounts (IDAs), which was proposed by Sherraden (1991). Funded from public and/or 
private sectors, IDAs provide subsidies through matching deposits. IDA program participants 
withdraw matched savings for home purchase, post-secondary education, microenterprise, and 
sometimes other uses (Schreiner, Clancy, and Sherraden, 2002). In total there may be about 500 IDA 
programs and 20,000 accounts nationwide (Sherraden, 2005).  
 
The expansion of inclusive asset-based policy is based on institutional saving theory suggesting that 
institutional features influence saving (Sherraden, 1991). Institutional saving theory has strengths in 
explaining asset accumulation of low-income households and in being applied to policy development 
targeted to low-income households (Beverly and Sherraden, 1999). Empirical evidence from IDAs 
generally supports institutional saving theory (Curley, Ssewamala, and Sherraden, 2005; Grinstein-
Weiss, Wagner, and Ssewamala, 2005; Schreiner et al., 2001, 2002; Ssewamala and Sherraden, 2004; 
Sherraden et al., 2003; Sherraden and Barr, 2005). At least two results are noteworthy. First, the poor 
in IDA programs can save. Contrary to the stereotyped opinion that the poor cannot save, they have 
saved in IDA programs. Second, institutional factors explain a significant part of saving outcomes. 
Controlling for individual socioeconomic demographics, institutional factors are significantly and 
meaningfully related to saving performance.   
 
Building on previous research, this study makes contributions to knowledge in two key ways. First, the 
study explores more thoroughly diverse theories of saving. While there is a substantial literature 
quantifying the extent to which individual preferences, socioeconomic background, or institutional 
features explain saving, there is little research examining these competing theories in a single model 
with a comparative approach. Not only institutional saving theory but also economical, psychological, 
and social stratification theories will be examined in this study. In addition, the study assesses the 
degree to which institutional theory explains savings outcomes in IDAs, taking account of the other 
theories. Second, we use longitudinal data which enables us to examine how changes in the economic 
situation of participants influence asset accumulation. In particular, this study examines how changes in 
employment status affect saving. With a longitudinal survey designed to evaluate an IDA program in 
Tulsa, Oklahoma, this study aims to expand our knowledge of asset accumulation among low-income 
households.  
 
Theory and Evidence 
 
Theories have been developed to examine how individuals accumulate assets or wealth. Economists 
initiated the issue by addressing saving motives and economic models, such as life-cycle model, 
permanent income hypothesis, and so on. Sociologists have been interested in how social stratification 
and socialization influence assets accumulation. Racial stratification, for example, is one of social 
contexts related to asset ownership and accumulation. In a comparative study, it is critical to 
summarize key assumptions and propositions of each theory. This section classifies existing theories 
into three perspectives: 1) individual perspective; 2) social stratification perspective; and 3) institutional 
perspective.  
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Individual Perspective 
 
The individual-oriented perspective in this study consists of neoclassical economics, economic 
psychology, and behavioral economics. Despite diversity these, are common in key ways. First, 
individuals are considered rational or at least bounded rational agents optimizing resource allocation. 
Second, these theories prioritize individual decision-making rules of saving rather than social contexts 
or environments. Third, from the individual perspective, the primary purpose of saving is to secure 
future consumption (Beverly and Sherraden, 1999).  
 
Neoclassical economic views of asset accumulation can be viewed in two categories: the life-cycle 
hypothesis (LCH) and the permanent income hypothesis (PIH). LCH posits that individuals save to 
allocate available life resources to lifetime consumption (Browning and Crossley, 2001). An individual’s 
stage in the life cycle is considered as a primary factor influencing saving and asset accumulation. In 
PIH, since consumption depends on changes in permanent but not transitory income, increase in 
transitory income will be saved (Meghir, 2001). Commonly, neoclassical economic theories view 
savings primarily as a function of income. Savings are considered rational allocations of current income 
for future consumption. Empirical evidence tends to reject LCH, since the elderly do not generally 
dissave after retirement (Engen et al., 1999; Hildebrand, 2001; Hubbard et al., 1994). However, LCH 
still provides an important cornerstone for understanding saving patterns through the life course 
(Browning and Crossley, 2001). In case of PIH, results are mixed. While models using aggregate data 
tend to reject PIH (Mankiw and Shapiro, 1985; Galĩ, 1991; Pistaferri,1998), some empirical findings 
tested on micro data provide evidence in favor of PIH (DeJuan and Seater, 1999).  
 
In contrast to neoclassical economics, economic psychology emphasizes psychological factors such as 
personal expectations, perceptions, and attitudes (Katona, 1975). An assumption of economic 
psychology is that perceptions of individuals mediate the relationship between economic conditions 
and economic behavior. Put simply, if economic conditions are expected to be pessimistic, savings will 
increase. Two key concepts, ability to save and willingness to save, come from Katona (1975). Ability 
to save is related to who can save. Generally, Katona expects that frequent savers would be younger 
married couples in the middle-income groups. Ability to save does not guarantee high savings. Rather, 
saving depends on an individual’s willingness to save. Willingness to save is related to consumer 
sentiment, which is a function of the evaluation and expectation of economic conditions. Empirical 
research tends to reject this theory in that psychological predictors have very low explanatory power in 
research (Furnham, 1985; Linquist, 1981; Lunt and Livingstone, 1991). 
 
Based on the expectation that psychological underpinnings will improve exploratory power of 
economics, behavioral economists explain asset accumulation by introducing concepts such as self-
control, mental accounting, and rules-of-thumb (Shefrin and Thaler, 1988; Thaler, 1994). The 
individual is viewed as a “farsighted planner and a myopic doer (Thaler and Shefrin, 1981:394).” The 
individual as a myopic doer can constrain consumption and save by adopting rules-of-thumb or self-
control. Empirical research testing behavioral economics and asset accumulation suggests that 
psychological factors such as self-control, inertia, and rules-of-thumb are significantly related to saving 
patterns and outcomes (Choi et al., 2003; Graham and Isaac, 1998; Madrian and Shea, 2001; Thaler and 
Benartzi, 2004). 
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Social Stratification Perspective 
 
Social stratification theory views social class as a set of life conditions that are a powerful 
determinant of many kinds of outcomes (Sorensen, 2000). Social stratification theory has strengths 
in explaining why poverty persists from generation to generation. Through similar life chances from 
generation to generation, low-income households may have limited opportunities to move out of the 
cycle of intergenerational poverty. Likewise, social stratification theory explains intergenerational 
wealth inequality. From this perspective, wealth is viewed as a vehicle maintaining and transmitting 
social and economic status (Bowles and Gintis, 2000).    
 
Intergenerational persistence of wealth inequality is not explained simply by bequests but also 
reflects parent-offspring similarities in traits influencing wealth accumulation (Bowles and Gintis, 
2000; Charles and Hurst, 2003; Chiteji and Stafford, 1999). Different classes are believed to have 
different socialization processes. Research on socialization supports the argument that class is 
associated with important socialization differences (Sorensen, 2000). For example, children can have 
different perception of savings depending on how they are socialized in their families, schools, or 
communities (Webley, Levine, and Lewis, 1991). Different perceptions can lead to different 
outcomes in asset accumulation in adulthood. According to Charles and Hurst (2003), children’s 
saving propensities are determined by mimicking their parents’ behavior. These results suggest that 
experiences in low social class may affect the socialization process of children and result in asset 
poverty in adulthood.  
 
A social stratification perspective suggests that wealth can be a key dimension of racial inequality. 
“Conceptualizing racial inequality through wealth revolutionizes our conception of its nature and 
magnitude and our assessment of whether it is declining or increasing (Shapiro, 2001: 12).” 
Research has examined the relationship between race and wealth (Oliver and Shapiro, 1995; 
Shapiro, 2001). One common finding is that minority groups, especially African Americans, are 
likely to own far fewer assets than Caucasians (Oliver & Shapiro, 1995).   
 
First, since access to institutionalized savings plans is convenient and decreases transaction costs, 
individuals with access to saving institutions are more likely to save (Beverly & Sherraden, 1999). 
Second, information and knowledge of how to save influence saving behaviors (Lusardi, 2003). In 
IDA programs, all participants are required to take financial education, which has positive effects on 
savings (Schreiner et al., 2002). Third, performance in saving programs may depend on incentives. 
Matching grants, tax-free earnings, and rebates can be types of incentives (Clancy et al., 2006). In 
particular, matching was found to have positive effects on saving outcomes in pensions (Munnell et 
al., 2001/2002) and in 529 college saving plans (Clancy et al., 2006). Fourth, facilitation—assistance 
with participation and savings—appears to be a key feature of most contractual saving programs 
(Schreiner & Sherraden, 2007). Automatic enrollment and automatic deposit, for example, are 
significantly associated with participation levels and contribution levels in 401(k)s (Madrian & Shea, 
2001) and 529 plans (Clancy et al., 2006). Fifth, institutionalization of expectations encourages 
savings achievement. In IDAs, for example, the match cap is regarded as a target savings amount, 
and often becomes a goal for participants (Schreiner et al., 2002). Sixth, restrictions limit certain 
types of actions so that savings goals can be achieved. Restrictions can be measured by match caps 
or by limits on the use of matched withdrawals (Ssewamala & Sherraden, 2004). Last, whether saving 
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plans are secure influences participation and saving outcomes (Mason et al., 2006; Schreiner & 
Sherraden, 2007). 
Institutional Perspective 
 
Institutional saving theory can increase our knowledge of how individuals, especially the poor, can save 
(Sherraden, 1991). Institutional saving theory may help us understand how individuals and institutions 
interact for asset accumulation. Given that low savings by the poor can be explained in part by limited 
institutional opportunities, the theory suggests that institutional factors other than income and 
preferences may influence saving behaviors of low-income families (Beverly and Sherraden, 1999). 
Seven institutional factors have been proposed (Schreiner and Sherraden, 2007; Sherraden and Barr, 
2005). They include information, incentives, facilitation, expectation, access, restrictions, and security. 
This study focuses on the first four institutional factors because measures of the four factors have 
variations in the CAPTC IDA program.  
 
First, people with knowledge of how to save are inclined to behave differently from those without 
(Bernheim and Garrett, 2003; Lusardi, 2003). In IDA programs, all participants are required to take 
financial education. It is assumed that the poor have more to learn about how and why they save and 
that financial education will have positive effects on saving (Sherraden, Schreiner, and Beverly, 
2003). Second, performance in saving programs may depend on incentives. Matching grants, tax-free 
earnings, and rebates can be types of incentives (Clancy et al., 2006). Munnell, Sunden, and Taylor 
(2001/2002) find a positive relationship between employer’s match and pension outcomes of 
employees, such as participation rates and contribution rates. Types of matching grants received are 
found to be significantly associated with contribution amount and deposit frequency in 529 college 
savings plans (Clancy et al., 2006). Third, facilitation means assistance with participation and savings. 
Sherraden et al. (2003) regard facilitation as a key feature of most contractual saving programs. 
Automatic enrollment or automatic deposit are significantly associated with participation levels and 
contribution levels in 401ks (Choi et al., 2004; Madrian and Shea, 2001) and 529 college savings 
plans (Clancy et al., 2006). Last, achievement of expectations is also institutionalized. In IDAs, the 
match cap is regarded as a target savings amount, which often becomes a goal for participants 
(Sherraden et al., 2003).  
 
Methodology 
 
Data and Sample 
 
This paper studies participants in an IDA program at the Community Action Project of Tulsa County 
(CAPTC). CAPTC is a multi-service community agency whose target population is working poor 
households at the Tulsa metropolitan area. The Tulsa IDA program was one of a series of local 
programs initiated under American Dream Demonstration (ADD), which is the first large-scale test of 
IDAs. Overall, CAPTC was a typical IDA program. Eligibility was limited to employed people with 
household income at or below 150 percent of the poverty line. CAPTC offered a match rate of 2:1 for 
matched withdrawals for home purchase and a match rate of 1:1 for all other uses. The time cap was 
36 months from the date of account opening. Saving purposes were home purchase, post-secondary 
education, small business, home repair, and retirement.  
 
D O  I N S T I T U T I O N S  R E A L L Y  M A T T E R  F O R  S A V I N G  A M O N G  L O W - I N C O M E  H O U S E H O L D S ?  
 
 
 
 
 
C E N T E R  F O R  S O C I A L  D E V E L O P M E N T  
W A S H I N G T O N  U N I V E R S I T Y  I N  S T .  L O U I S  
 
6
Within ADD, the Tulsa IDA program employed an experimental design where a total sample of 
1,103 eligible participants was assigned to treatment (n=537) and control (n=566) group. 
Participants in only the treatment group were allowed to open IDA accounts during the 
demonstration period. Therefore, this study used only the sample (N=537) in the treatment group. 
In addition, the Tulsa IDA program has a longitudinal design where the baseline interview was 
conducted just before the assignment, followed by 18 month and 48 month follow-up survey. The 
data are useful in testing the extent to which competing theories explain savings outcomes among 
low-income households, since the data have many measures related to saving theories. In addition, 
monitoring data have institutional features and account information. We have merged the survey of 
participants in CAPTC with the monitoring data for this study.  
 
This study suffered a large reduction in the sample because of attrition, non-participation in the 
experiment, and missing cases in the analysis. The sample had an attrition rate of about 23 percent 
(n=125). The sample (N=537) in the treatment group at the baseline were reduced to 412 
respondents at wave 3. In addition, of 537 participants at the baseline, it was found that about 12 
percent (n=66) of the sample did not open IDA accounts over the course of the demonstration 
period (Han, Schreiner, and Sherraden, 2007). In particular, 43 of 412 respondents at wave 3 had not 
opened IDA accounts, reducing the sample to 369. In addition, it was found that there are 39 
missing observations in the variables used in the analyses. These processes results in only 61 percent 
(n=330) of the sample remained for the study.   
 
Given that there was a large reduction in the sample from the original sample of 537 to 330, this 
study compared the socioeconomic demographic characteristics at the baseline of the 330 
respondents with the 207 non-respondents that were eliminated. There were no significant 
differences in most socioeconomic characteristics such as age, gender, marital status, employment 
status, education attainment, household size between the two groups. They were also similar in 
income, poverty status, total financial assets and other assets at the baseline. They differed 
significantly, however, in terms of race/ethnicity, real assets, and total liabilities. African Americans 
and “the other racial groups” are more likely to be non-respondents (χ2 = 7.17, df = 2; p=.028). 
Although the significance levels are marginal, the respondents owned more real assets ($13,778 vs. 
$9,998; t=-1.85; p=.066) and total liabilities ($14,381 vs. $11,505; t=-1.74; p=.083) than the non-
respondents.  
 
Measurement  
 
Dependent variables. Similar to previous studies of IDAs, two measures are created to examine saving 
performance in IDAs. First, average monthly net deposit (AMND) is defined as net deposit per 
month and is calculated by dividing net deposits by the number of participation months (Curley et 
al., 2005; Grinstein-Weiss and Wagner, 2006; Schreiner et al., 2001, 2002). Net deposit is defined as 
deposits plus earned interest minus unmatched withdrawals. Another measure of saving outcome in 
IDA is deposit frequency ratio (DFR). DFR is created to measure how regularly participants save. It 
is defined by dividing the number of deposit months by the participation months. It is theoretically 
greater than zero and equal to or less than one (Grinstein-Weiss and Wagner, 2006; Grinstein-Weiss, 
Zhan, and Sherraden, 2004; Schreiner et al., 2001).  
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Table 1. Operationalization and Descriptive Statistics (N=330) 
Variables Operationalization Mean or Percentage 
Saving outcomes 
AMND 
DFR 
 
(Deposits + matching)/months of participation 
Number of deposits / months of participation 
 
23.28 
0.59 
Individual-oriented perspective  
  Age Age when a participant opened an IDA account 40.64 
  Regular income/100 
 
  Irregular income/100 
 
Sum of wages, government benefits, pensions, and 
investment income 
Sum of self-employment, child support, gifts,  and other 
sources 
11.98 
 
2.83 
Optimistic expectations 
of economic conditions  
Current economic situation 
Future economic conditions 
35.50 
34.15 
Rules-of-thumb related 
to Saving 
Written budget or spending plan (always=1;  
sometimes or never =0) 
Regular saving each month 
38.75 
 
36.31 
Sociological Stratification Perspective  
Race/ethnicity  
 
Whites 
Blacks 
Others (Asian Americans, Latinos, and others) 
46.34 
41.73 
8.40 
Education attainment 
 
High school graduation or less 
Some college 
College graduation or more 
29.54 
42.00 
28.45 
Parents’ saving Did your parents save in your childhood?  (yes=1) 49.05 
Saving in childhood Did you save in your childhood? (yes=1) 42.00 
Institutional perspective   
Matching rate 1:1 (coded as 0); 1:2 (coded as 1) 51.22 
Annual match cap $2,250 (coded as 1); $1,500 and $750 (0) 89.70 
Financial education hours  10.82 
Direct deposit Participants using direct deposit are coded as 1  10.30 
Other variables 
Gender  
Marital status 
 
 
Number of adults  
Number of children  
Unemployment  
 
Public assistance  
Liquid assets /1,000 
 
 
Other financial assets  
/1,000 
 
 
Real assets /1,000 
 
Total liabilities /1,000 
 
0= male, 1= female 
Married 
Single never married 
Divorced, separated, or widowed 
18 years of age or older 
17 years or younger 
Participants experiencing unemployment at 
wave 2 or wave 3 are coded as 1 
Participants receiving public assistance 
Sum of amounts in checking, saving,  
money market account and certificates of deposits 
Sum of saving bonds, education account, stocks, bonds, 
mutual funds, savings at home or friends, and Christmas 
club or vacation account 
Sum of values of business, car, property, and  home  
Sum of home mortgage, education loans, credit card debt, 
and other debts 
 
77.78 
24.12 
35.77 
40.11 
2.37 
1.73 
21.68 
 
40.92 
.79 
 
 
.54 
 
 
 
15.46 
 
15.16 
Note: Except unemployment, the variables in this study are measured at the baseline. AMND stands for Average 
Monthly Net Deposits and DFR stands for Deposit Frequency Ratio. 
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Independent variables. This study uses key constructs of the saving theories discussed above. First, age 
and regular and irregular income are key measures of neoclassical economics. Second, two measures 
of perception of current and future economic conditions are constructed to examine how 
psychological perceptions are related to saving in IDA. Third, two variables, written budget plan and 
regular saving, are included to measure rules-of-thumb, which are hypothesized to influence saving. 
Fourth, the study uses two measures of social stratification, education and race. Fifth, parents’ saving 
and saving as a child are used to examine how socialization influences saving. Sixth, since only an 
IDA program is used in this study, institutional features with variations among participants are used. 
Therefore, incentives (matching rate), information (hours of financial education), expectation 
(annual match cap), and facilitation (direct deposit use) are employed to test the effects of 
institutional features on saving. Last, other socioeconomic demographics and changes in 
employment status, in particular, unemployment at wave 2 or wave 3, are included in the models. 
Except unemployment at wave 2 or 3, the other predictors are measured at baseline. 
Operationalization and descriptive statistics of variables used in this study are presented in Table 1.  
 
Data Analysis Plan 
 
After descriptive statistics of variables, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models are 
conducted to estimate relationships between predictors and saving outcomes. Hierarchical regression 
models are employed to test the extent to which individual-oriented perspective, social stratification 
perspective, and institutional theory matter for saving in IDAs, respectively. In the hierarchical 
models, a full model with all perspectives of saving theory is compared to models without each 
block of perspectives. 
 
Results 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables in the analysis. The average AMND is $23.28, 
and the average DFR is .59, suggesting that participants in CAPTC IDA program made deposits 
approximately 7 months during a year, on average. The saving outcomes are better than those of 
participants in ADD (e.g., AMND = $14.94, DFR = .44). However, like the total sample in ADD, the 
sample in this study is more likely to be female, non-married, African Americans, and working poor.  
 
The average age of participants in CAPTC IDA program is about 41. The study divided total income 
into two categories, regular and irregular income, to examine the permanent income hypothesis that 
transitory income will be saved (Meghir, 2001). Recurrent monthly income (wages, government 
benefits, pensions, and investments) was about 82 percent of total income with a mean value of $1,465. 
Intermittent income (self-employment, child support, gifts, and other sources) for participants in 
CAPTC IDA was about 18 percent of total income and had a mean monthly value of $283. About 35 
percent and 34 percent of participants have optimistic expectations of current and future economic 
situations, respectively. Regarding rules-of-thumb related to saving, about 39 percent of participants 
have a written budget or saving plan. In addition, about 36 percent saved regularly.   
 
D O  I N S T I T U T I O N S  R E A L L Y  M A T T E R  F O R  S A V I N G  A M O N G  L O W - I N C O M E  H O U S E H O L D S ?  
 
 
 
 
 
C E N T E R  F O R  S O C I A L  D E V E L O P M E N T  
W A S H I N G T O N  U N I V E R S I T Y  I N  S T .  L O U I S  
 
9
Like the ADD sample, a high percentage (about 42 percent) of the CAPTC IDA program is African 
American. In addition, the sample in this study has high education status, Forty-two percent have some 
college and 28 percent have college graduation or higher education. Two measures of saving 
experience are included to examine how saving socialization is associated with saving in IDA. About 49 
percent of the sample said that their parents saved in their childhood, and 42 percent of the sample 
said they saved in their childhood.     
 
About 51 percent of participants have a 2:1 matching rate, which suggests that this same percentage of 
participants save for buying a house. A majority of participants (90%) have a high match cap of $2,250. 
Participants took about 11 hours of general financial education and only 10 percent of participants 
used a direct deposit service.  
 
Table 2. R2 Changes in Hierarchical Regression Analyses of AMND and DFR 
 
Model of AMND 
 
Model of DFR 
 
Model 1 Full Model 
  
Model 2 Full Model 
R2 .404 .415 .416 .427 
R2 .011 .011 
Individual-oriented  
Perspective  
as a last block p-value of R2 .559 .552 
R2 .360 .415 .400 .427 
R2 .055 .027 
Social Stratification 
Perspective  
as a last block p-value of R2 p<.001 .028 
R2 .272 .415 .204 .427 
R2 .143 .223 
Institutional 
Perspective  
as a last block p-value of R2 p<.001 p<.001 
Note: AMND stands for average monthly net deposits and DFR stands for deposit frequency ratio.  
 
 
Multivariate Regression Results 
 
To examine the degree to which each perspective contributes to explaining the variance in saving 
outcomes, a set of hierarchical regression analyses have been run. Changes in R2 and its significance 
level are presented in Table 2. First, controlling for the social stratification perspective and the 
institutional perspective, the individual perspective offers no additional explanation of the saving 
outcomes, AMND and DFR. Second, small but significant additional variance in AMND and DRF is 
explained by the social stratification perspective, controlling for the individual perspective and the 
institutional perspective. Last, a block of institutional perspective significantly adds variance to both 
AMND and DFR. Controlling for the key measures of other theories, measures of institutional saving 
theory added 14.3 percentage of the variance in the AMND and 22.3 percentage of the variance in the 
DFR.  
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Table 3. Multivariate Regression Analyses of AMND and DFR (N=330) 
AMND DFR  
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant 9.62  -5.09  .32 ** .05
Individual-oriented perspective    
  Age .26 † .09  .00 * .00
  Income 
Regular income  
Irregular income 
-.14
.75
 
 
* 
.05
.59
 
 
* 
-.00
.00
 
-.00
.00
 
 
  Expectations of economic conditions  
Current situation 
Future situation 
-3.23
1.89
 
 
 
-2.95
1.61
 
-.01
.05
 
-.01
.05
 
 
† 
  Rules-of-thumb related to saving 
Written budget or spending plan 
Regular saving each month 
-1.14
2.47
 
 
 
-1.53
.70
 
-.02
.04
 
-.02
.00
 
 
Social Stratification Perspective    
Race (Whites: reference) 
Blacks 
Others 
-12.02
.23
 
*** 
 
-11.23
.37
 
*** 
 
-.09
-.06
 
** 
 
-.08
-.07
 
** 
Education(H.S. graduation: reference) 
Some college 
College graduation or more 
 
4.31
8.47
 
* 6.21
7.60
 
* 
* 
.03
.08
 
† .06
.06
 
* 
Parents’ saving in your childhood -1.64  -2.45  -.01  -.01
Saving in your childhood .23  1.43  .01  .01
Institutional perspective    
2:1 Matching rate  -12.86 ***  -.09 ** 
$2,250 Annual match cap  14.63 *** .08 † 
Hours of financial education  1.33 *** .03 *** 
Direct deposit use  -2.19  .16 *** 
Other variables 
Female 
Marital status (single: reference) 
Married  
Divorced, separated, or widowed 
No of adults 
No of children 
Unemployment at wave 2 or wave 3 
Public assistance receipt 
Liquid assets / 1,000 
Other assets / 1,000 
Real value assets / 1,000 
Total liabilities / 1,000 
-3.38
-2.61
5.59
6.08
-1.25
-7.12
-4.63
1.43
.20
.08
.03
 
 
† 
† 
† 
* 
† 
* 
 
 
 
-1.10
-.57
4.11
4.37
-.43
-7.47
-3.23
1.13
-.02
.00
-.01
 
 
 
 
** 
 
* 
 
 
 
-.02
-.08
.09
.11
-.00
-.05
-.06
.01
-.00
.00
.00
 
 
** 
 
 
† 
 
 
* 
 
-.01
.
-.07
.06
08
.01
-.07
-.06
.01
-.00
.00
-.00
 
 
† 
* 
 
* 
* 
 
 
 
F value 
Adjusted R2 
5.030*** 
.218 
8.08*** 
.363 
3.452*** 
.145 
8.49*** 
.377 
Note: AMND stands for average monthly net deposits and DFR stands for deposit frequency ratio. While 
Models 1 and 3 include variables of individual perspective and social stratification perspective, Models 2 and 4 
add institutional features into Models 1 and 3, respectively.  
† p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001 
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Since the institutional perspective appears to be a much more influential theory affecting saving 
outcomes, Table 3 presents the results of OLS regression models where institutional features are 
included as a last block. As expected, key measures of the individual perspective have weak power in 
explaining saving among low-income households in the IDA program. Age, expectation of current 
economic situations, and rules-of-thumb related to saving are not significantly associated with saving 
outcomes in the full models. In particular, while age is significantly associated with both AMND and 
DFR in models without institutional features, in the models with institutional features age is no longer 
significant. This study finds that, while regular income is not significantly associated with AMND or 
DFR, irregular income is positively associated with AMND, thus supporting permanent income 
hypothesis. However, irregular income is not a significant predictor of DFR. Marginally but 
significantly, participants with an optimistic view of future conditions are likely to save more 
frequently. This finding is contrary to economic psychology suggesting that people with pessimistic 
views of future economic conditions save more (Katona, 1975). Separately, this study examines the 
association between total income and saving outcomes, but finds no significant relationships between 
them.   
 
Two measures of social stratification have strong influence on saving in IDAs. First, consistent with 
previous research examining relationship between race and saving outcomes in IDAs (Curley et al., 
2005; Grinstein-Weiss and Wagner, 2006; Schreiner et al., 2001, 2002), this study finds that saving is 
more difficult for African Americans. While other race has no significant differences in AMND and 
DFR compared with Caucasians, African Americans save $11.23 less and make less frequent deposits 
compared with Caucasians. Second, education is positively associated with saving in IDAs. While 
participants with some college save $6.21 more than the reference group (participants with high school 
graduation or less education), those with college graduation or higher education make $7.60 more in 
net deposits than the reference group. Regarding DFR, while participants with some college education 
save more frequently than the reference, those with the highest education status have no difference in 
deposit frequency in a model that includes institutional features. However, this study finds no 
significant associations for two measures of socialization, parents’ saving and saving as a child.  
 
Institutional features are significantly associated with saving in IDAs. First, participants with higher 
saving expectations measured by annual match cap saved more and more frequently since they opened 
IDA accounts. Participants with a match cap of $2,250 save $14.63 more per month than those with a 
$1,500 or less match cap. This finding suggests that participants may mentally convert match caps into 
goals or expectations (Schreiner et al., 2001) and they attempt to achieve the goals of saving in an IDA. 
Second, information as measured by the hours of financial education is positively associated with 
saving outcomes in IDAs, which is consistent with earlier research on financial education in ADD 
(Curley et al., 2005; Schreiner et al., 2001, 2002; Ssewamala and Sherraden, 2004). A one hour increase 
in financial education is associated with $1.33 increase in AMND. In addition, financial education is 
associated with regular saving by IDA participants. Third, automatic deposit is hypothesized to 
facilitate saving. While direct deposit is not a significant predictor of AMND, participants using direct 
deposit make more frequent deposits than those not using direct deposit. It could be that participants 
who sign up for direct deposit elect to contribute smaller but regular amounts to eliminate the risk of 
being short of necessary cash or creating an overdraft in IDA accounts (Schreiner et al., 2002). Last, 
while matching rate is a central feature of IDAs, unexpectedly, higher matching rate appears to lead to 
less saving in this study. Participants with 2:1 match rate saved $12.86 in AMND less than participants 
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with 1:1 match rate. Furthermore, a higher matching rate is negatively associated with DFR, which 
suggests that participants with higher matching rate save less frequently. These findings differ with 
previous studies where matching rates do not have significant associations with saving (Curley et al., 
2005; Schreiner et al., 2001, 2002). It could be that higher match rates create a “goal effect” in which 
IDA participants can save less and still reach their asset goal (Schreiner and Sherraden, 2007). 
Regarding the other institutional features, participants with a 2:1 matching rate are likely to take less 
hours of financial education and to have a $1,500 or less matching cap. There was no significant 
difference in direct deposit use between the two groups (See Table 4).   
 
Table 4. Key Differences of Participants with Different Matching Rate 
 Participants with 
1:1 matching rate 
(n=157) 
Participants with 
2:1 matching rate 
(n=173) 
 
t test or 
Chi-Square 
 
p-value 
 
Female (%) 
 
71.11 
 
84.13 
 
9.04 .003
Age 43.53 37.86 5.40 p<.001
Single and not married (%) 27.22 43.91 11.18 .001
Number of adults 1.45 1.30 2.47 .014
Number of children 1.51 1.94 -3.04 .003
African Americans (%) 34.44 48.68 7.68 .006
Irregular income 3.46 2.23 2.43 .016
Liquid assets/1,000 1.05 .54 2.34 .020
Real value assets/1,000 26.41 5.02 8.43 p<.001
Direct deposit use (%) 11.11 9.52 .25 .616
Annual match cap (%) 92.78 86.77 3.60 .058
Hours of financial education 11.86 9.83 5.77 p<.001
 
Several findings of relationships between socioeconomic characteristics and the saving outcomes are 
noteworthy. First, participants with more adults in household saved more frequently suggesting that 
the number of adults in household might be related to accessibility to saving programs. Second, 
participants receiving public assistance saved less frequently in CAPTC IDA program. However, it is 
interesting that there is no difference in AMND. Third, while total liabilities may hinder saving in IDA, 
owning certain forms of assets may predict positive effects on savings in IDA (Curley et al., 2005). The 
results of regression analyses indicate that only liquid assets are significantly related to AMND. 
Although we cannot confirm, this finding suggests that participants with more liquid assets might 
transfer some part of liquid assets to IDA accounts. Last, as discussed before, the CAPTC IDA 
program has strict eligibility in that participants should be employed to open an IDA account. 
Although unemployment may negatively influence saving in IDAs, there is little research on this 
question. This study finds that 22 percent of participants experienced unemployment at wave 2 or 
wave 3. No participants experienced unemployment at both waves. Although unemployment was 
transitory, the effects of unemployment on saving outcomes were not negligible. The unemployed at 
wave 2 or 3 saved $7.47 less per month than those who were employed through the demonstration 
period. As expected, the unemployed also saved less frequently than the employed.  
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Discussion 
 
Several limitations of this study are noteworthy. First, the findings of this study may be affected by the 
large sample attrition. Therefore, care should be exercised in interpreting the results of this study. In 
addition, participants in IDAs are not a representative sample of the overall low-income population. 
Most IDA programs have program-selected targeting groups. Also, individuals select themselves into 
the program. Second, since this study examined savings only in the IDA program, we cannot say 
whether this is new savings. Third, although we used key measures of each theory, this study is not to 
confirm the validity of each theory. Results may be an artifact of weak measures of key constructs of 
the saving theories. Future studies are required for tighter theoretical specification and empirical 
examination of the different perspectives. Fourth, this study used only the time varying factor of 
unemployment. Future studies should examine changes of other socioeconomic demographics that 
may be associated with saving in IDAs.  
 
Despite limitations, several findings are worth highlighting. First, consistent with previous research on 
IDAs, this study finds that low-income households can save in an IDA program. This suggests that 
inclusion in asset-based policy should be a priority to help low-income households save. Furthermore, 
taking account for other theoretical background, institutional saving theory has independent and 
significant explanatory power in saving outcomes. This strongly suggests that institutional structures of 
saving plans matter for saving among low-income households, and that institutional features should be 
designed to encourage greater saving.  
  
Second, the finding of a negative association of match rate and AMND calls for further investigation. 
Although the CAPTC program is designed to help the more disadvantaged (Table 4) save for a home, 
the disparity between saving in an IDA program and the real cost to buy a home might influence the 
negative association between higher matching rate and saving outcomes. As this study of an IDA 
program implies, future studies are necessary to examine how participants save in each program level 
to understand dynamic mechanisms in different situations and environments. In addition, more 
attention should be paid to institutional structure targeting the more disadvantaged to help them save 
greater. A special education program or counseling might be introduced for this purpose.   
 
Finally, this study suggests that unemployment might be a barrier to saving in IDAs. Since low-income 
households have high job instability (Marcotte, 1995), unemployment through the demonstration 
period might prevent participants from saving more in IDAs. Given that unemployment is significantly 
associated with saving in IDAs, policy makers and practitioners should consider how to design IDA 
programs encouraging participants experiencing unemployment to save. One way might be to extend 
the time cap period of IDA participants who experience unemployment for as long as they are 
unemployed.   
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